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Abstract 
 
Impersonal default rules, chosen by private or public institutions, establish settings 
and starting points for countless goods and activities -- cell phones, rental car 
agreements, computers, savings plans, health insurance, websites, privacy, and much 
more. Some of these rules do a great deal of good, but others might be poorly chosen, 
perhaps because those who select them are insufficiently informed, perhaps because they 
are self-interested, perhaps because one size does not fit all. The existence of 
heterogeneity argues against impersonal default rules. The obvious alternative to 
impersonal default rules, of particular interest when individual situations are diverse, is 
active choosing, by which people are required to make decisions on their own. The 
choice between impersonal default rules and active choosing depends largely on the costs 
of decisions and the costs of errors. In complex and unfamiliar areas, impersonal default 
rules have significant advantages, but where people prefer to choose, and where learning 
is both feasible and important, active choosing may be best, especially if people’s 
situations are relevantly dissimilar. At the same time, it is increasingly possible for 
private and public institutions to produce highly personalized default rules, which reduce 
the problems with one-size-fits-all defaults. In principle, personalized default rules could 
be designed for every individual in the relevant population. Collection of the information 
that would allow accurate personalization might be burdensome and expensive, and 
might also raise questions about privacy. But at least when choice architects can be 
trusted, personalized default rules offer almost all of the advantages of active choosing 
without the disadvantages. 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Consider the following: 
 
1.  In Germany, about 12 percent of people consent to be organ donors, whereas 
in Austria, the rate is 99.9 percent. We might speculate that this dramatic 
difference stems from different cultures, different norms, or extraordinarily 
effective  educational  campaigns  in  Austria,  but  the  speculation  would  be 
wrong. Instead it results from law and more particularly from the default 
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rule.
1 In  Austria,  consent  is  presumed,  subject  to  opt  out.  In  Germany, 
consent is not presumed, and people have to opt in. 
2.  Some people have been interested in increasing consumers’ use of “green 
energy” – energy sources that do not significantly contribute to air pollution, 
climate  change,  and  other  environmental  problems.  While  such  energy 
sources  are  available  in  many  places, f e w   people  choose  them 
(notwithstanding the fact that in response to questions, they say that they 
would do so
2). Nonetheless, two communities in Germany do show strikingly 
high levels of green energy use – well over 90 percent.
3 This is a dramatic 
contrast  to  the  level  of  participation  in  green  energy  programs  in  other 
German towns, which is around 1 percent.
4 The reason for the difference is 
that in the two relevant communities, people are automatically enrolled in 
green energy programs, and they have to opt out.
5 
3.  In the United States, savings rates have often been quite low, because people 
have  delayed  enrollment  in  pension  plans.  A  number  of  employers  have 
produced significant increases in savings through one simple initiative: make 
enrollment automatic, subject to opt out. The result of this initiative has been 
dramatically to increase participation rates.
6 
 
Those who devise default rules are choice architects,
7 in the sense that they design 
the social background against which choices are made. It is not possible to dispense with 
a social background, and some kind of choice architecture is therefore inevitable. No less 
than social norms and available information, default rules are central features of choice 
architecture. Moreover, default rules, even or perhaps especially if they appear to be 
invisible, count as a prime “nudge.”
8 If private or public institutions establish a default 
rule, they do not force anyone to do anything. On the contrary, they maintain freedom of 
choice.
9 Whether people must opt out or opt in, they are permitted to do so as they see fit. 
What is striking and somewhat mysterious is that default rules nonetheless have a large 
impact,  because  they  tend  to  stick.
10 If  a  private  or  public  institution  seeks  to  alter 
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outcomes, switching the default rule may be a highly effective route. With respect to 
health care, consumer protection, the availability of organs, energy use, environmental 
protection,  savings,  and  much  more,  the  choice  of  the  default  rule  is  exceedingly 
important. Public-spirited or self-interested people, in both the private and public spheres, 
might use default rules to produce outcomes that they deem desirable. 
 
One  of  the  most  important  tasks  of  a  legal  system  is  to  establish  default  rules. 
Indeed, many policies operate through default rules, and contract law consists in large 
part of such rules. What happens if the parties are silent on whether employees may be 
fired only “for cause,” or instead for whatever reason the employer deems fit? A default 
rule might specify the answer, and it might well “stick.”
11 In the law of contract, people 
often do not contract around default rules even if it is relatively costless for them to do so. 
Of course some legal rules are mandatory; they do not merely set the default. Employees 
are  not  allowed  to  opt  out  of  the  prohibition  on  racial  discrimination  or  sexual 
harassment. But even in sensitive contexts, default rules might be important. For age 
discrimination, for example, the United States allows people to waive their rights at the 
point of retirement, subject to certain constraints.
 12 
 
In this Essay, I have two goals. The first is to provide a general overview of what we 
now know about default rules – about when they have large effects and when they do not, 
and exactly why. The second goal is to make some progress in understanding the choice 
among  three  alternatives:  impersonal  default  rules,  active  choosing,  and  personalized 
default rules. Most default rules are impersonal, in the sense that they do not distinguish 
among members of large groups to which they apply. Impersonal default rules might be 
chosen on several grounds. Perhaps there are no relevant differences among members of 
the groups affected by such rules, and hence impersonality is not damaging. Perhaps 
choice  architects  lack  the  information  that  would  justify  greater  personalization,  and 
hence impersonality is the only approach that is feasible. Perhaps active choosing would 
be an unnecessary and unhelpful burden, producing confusion and frustration without 
improving outcomes. 
 
As  we  will  see,  however,  active  choosing  can  have  significant  advantages  over 
impersonal  default  rules,  especially  when  choice  architects  are  ill-informed  or 
untrustworthy  and  the  relevant  population  is  diverse.  In  the  face  of  diversity,  active 
choosing may reduce the mistakes associated with impersonal default rules, and may also 
promote  learning.  Unfortunately,  active  choosing  can  also  impose  high  costs.  Life  is 
short, and people are busy, and if they were required to engage in active choosing in the 
many domains in which they now benefit from default rules, they would end up having 
time for little else.
13 The great promise of personalized default rules is that they might 
eliminate the problems associated with impersonal ones without imposing the costs of 
active choosing. As default rules become more personalized, the advantages of active 
choosing start to diminish, because personalized approaches can handle the problem of 
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heterogeneity  without  requiring  people  to  act  at  all.  In  many  respects,  personalized 
default  rules  promise  to  confer  large  social  benefits.  At  the  same  time,  it  can  be 
burdensome and expensive to produce accurate personalized default rules, and such rules 
might be used opportunistically by those who are motivated by their own self-interest, 
rather than the interests of potential choosers. 
 
My  basic  conclusion  is  that  the  choice  among  impersonal  default  rules,  active 
choosing, and personalized default rules cannot be made in the abstract. To know which 
is best, choice architects need to investigate the costs of decisions and the costs of errors. 
Four propositions are clear. First, impersonal default rules should generally be preferred 
to active choosing when the context is confusing and unfamiliar, when people would 
prefer not to choose, and when the population is not heterogeneous along any relevant 
dimension. Second, active choosing should generally be preferred to impersonal default 
rules when choice architects lack relevant information, when the context is familiar, when 
people would actually prefer to choose, and when there is relevant heterogeneity. Third, 
personalized default rules should generally be preferred to impersonal ones in the face of 
relevant heterogeneity. Fourth, personalized default rules (if accurate) have significant 
advantages over active choosing, because they produce benefits without real costs, at 
least if choice architects are trustworthy and if people are allowed to opt out.
14  
 
One of my basic claims is that in many domains, personalized default rules are the 
wave of the future, and for good reason. In ordinary life, family members and friends 
adopt, every day and in ways large and small (and often unconsciously), the functional 
equivalent of personalized default rules, by assuming that people will want in the future 
what they have wanted in the past -- or perhaps that they will want the same kinds of 
variety in the future that they have enjoyed in the past. For example, spouses and close 
friends  select  default  options  for  restaurants,  vacation  spots,  and  even  conversations, 
subject  to  opt  out.  As  information  accumulates  about  people’s  actual  choices,  many 
private and public institutions will be in a position to provide personalized default rules.
15 
II. Why Default Rules Matter 
A.  Three Further Illustrations 
To appreciate the importance and potential of default rules, it will be useful to 
provide further illustrations. For the moment, we shall be dealing only with impersonal 
default rules. In due course, we shall explore their limitations as well and turn to more 
personalized alternatives.  
1. Insurance. In the context of insurance, an unplanned, natural experiment showed 
that default rules can be very “sticky.”
16 New Jersey created a system in which the default 
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insurance program for motorists included a relatively low premium and no right to sue; 
purchasers were allowed to deviate from the default program and to purchase the right to 
sue  by  choosing  a  program  with  that  right  and  also  a  higher  premium.  By  contrast, 
Philadelphia offered a default program containing a full right to sue and a relatively high 
premium; purchasers could elect to switch to a new plan by “selling” the more ample 
right to sue and paying a lower premium.  
 
In both cases, the default rule tended to stick. A strong majority accepted the default 
rule in both states, with only about 20% of New Jersey drivers acquiring the full right to 
sue,  and  75%  of  Pennsylvanians  retaining  that  right.  Experiments  confirm  the  basic 
effect, showing that the value of the right to sue is much higher when it is presented as 
part of the default package.
17 
  
2. Privacy. There is good reason to think that privacy rights will be greatly affected 
by the default rule. Suppose that a public or private institution says that information about 
your behavior (for example, the websites that you visit) will not be shared with anyone 
unless you click on a button to allow information sharing. Now suppose that the same 
institution says that such information will be shared unless you click on a button to forbid 
such sharing. Will the results be the same? Far from it.
18  
 
If people are asked whether they want to “opt in” to information sharing, a lot of 
them will either ignore the question or decline -- on the ground that if their privacy is 
now protected, they will certainly not want to sacrifice that protection. In either case, 
their information will not be shared. If people are asked whether they want to opt out of 
information sharing, a lot of them will also ignore the question, or decline, on the ground 
that they might not want to lose the potential advantages of such sharing -- especially if 
they have to think a little bit, and read something complicated, in order to switch. In that 
case, their information will be shared. In the domain of privacy on the Internet, a great 
deal depends on the default rule. 
 
3. Vacation time. Might people’s workplace benefits, such as vacation time, depend 
on the legal default rule? To answer that question, consider a simple experiment that I 
conducted  a  few  years  ago.
19 About  seventy-five  randomly  chosen  law  students  were 
asked to answer question 1, and about seventy-five randomly chosen law students were 
asked to answer question 2. Note that the answers to these two questions were in many 
respects  quite  realistic.  Law  students  are  very  much  in  the  position  of  trading  off 
variables  in  the  selection  of  work,  and  both  vacation  time  and  salary  matter  to  their 
decisions. 
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Question 1:  
 
Imagine that you have accepted a job with a law firm in a large city. Your salary 
will  be  $120,000.  Under  state  law,  all  companies  must  provide  nonmanagerial 
employees, including associates at law firms, with a minimum of two weeks in vacation 
time each year. 
 
Suppose that the firm that you have chosen tells us that it will allow you to have 
two extra weeks of vacation, but at a somewhat reduced salary. What is the most that you 
would be willing to pay, in reduced salary, to obtain those two extra weeks of vacation 
time? (Assume that no adverse consequences could possibly come to you from bargaining 
for that extra vacation time.) 
 
Question 2: 
 
Imagine that you have accepted a job with a law firm in a large city. Your salary 
will  be  $120,000.  Under  state  law,  all  companies  must  provide  nonmanagerial 
employees, including associates at law firms, with a nonwaivable minimum of two weeks 
in vacation time each year. State law also provides that all companies must provide 
nonmanagerial employees, including associates at law firms, with a waivable extra two 
weeks in vacation time each year. The extra two weeks can be waived only as a result of 
"explicit, noncoerced agreements" between the parties. 
 
Suppose that the firm that you have chosen would be willing to pay you a certain 
amount, in extra salary, to get you to waive your right to the two extra weeks in vacation 
time. What is the least that the firm would have to pay you, in extra salary, to give up 
those two extra weeks? (Assume that no adverse consequences could possibly come to 
you from your refusal to waive, or from your demanding a high amount to waive.) 
 
The results were dramatic. If the legal default rule includes more vacation time, 
people will demand a great deal to give it up; if the legal default rule does not include 
more vacation time, people will not pay a great deal to “buy” it. More specifically, the 
median willingness to pay (question 1) was $6000, whereas the median willingness to 
accept (question 2) was $13,000. The medians did not significantly vary between first-
year law students and law students in their second and third years. The only noteworthy 
difference was that about four first-year students refused to name any amount, saying that 
no dollar figure would be “enough to make me give up my vacation.” These answers 
were excluded, and hence the observed difference in medians, of more than two-to-one, 
can be said to understate the real difference in responses.  
 
B.  Explanations 
   7 
A great deal of research explores exactly why default rules have such a large effect 
on outcomes.
20 There appear to be three contributing factors.  
 
1. Inertia. The first involves inertia and procrastination. To change the default rule, 
people must make an active choice to reject that rule. They have to focus on the relevant 
question – whether they should be automatically enrolled in a savings plan, or whether 
they should have green energy, or whether they would gain or lose from a privacy policy. 
Especially if the question is difficult or technical, it is tempting to defer the decision or 
not to make it at all. In view of the power of inertia and the tendency to procrastinate, 
people may simply continue with the status quo.  
 
Consider in this regard a study of television viewing, where inertia exerts a powerful 
force.
 21 As programs become more popular, the programs that follow them become more 
popular too, simply because the current channel is the default. More particularly, a ten 
percent increase in the popularity of the preceding program leads to a remarkable two–
three percent increase in the audience for the following program.
22 A striking finding is 
that stations exploit this behavior when scheduling their programs – and if they did not, 
they would lose up to 40 percent of their profits.
23 
 
For television programs, of course, all that is needed is to switch the channel, and 
channel-switching is hardly difficult. Opting in or opting out of default rules might be 
equally easy, but in many cases, it involves some thinking and some risk. The default rule 
might stick simply because people do not want to engage in that thinking and take that 
risk. Even if they want to do so, they might decide that they will do so tomorrow – and 
tomorrow never comes. 
 
2. Endorsement. The second factor involves what people might see as an implicit 
endorsement  of  the  default  rule.  If  choice  architects  have  explicitly  chosen  that  rule, 
people  may  believe  that  they  should  not  depart  from  it  unless  they  have  private 
information that would justify a change.
24 Suppose, for example, that the default choice is 
green energy, or that a public or private employer automatically enrolls employees into a 
particular pension plan. It is tempting to think that experts, or sensible people, believe 
that these are the right courses of action. Those who are deciding whether to opt out 
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might trust the choice architects well enough to follow their lead. Many people appear to 
think that the default was chosen by someone sensible and for a good reason. Especially 
if they lack experience or expertise, they might simply defer to what has been chosen for 
them. One implication of this explanation – suggestive of a method for testing whether 
inertia  or  instead  perceived  endorsement  is  making  the  default  rule  stick  –  is  that  if 
choosers do not trust the choice architect, they will be far more likely to opt out. 
 
3. Reference point. The default rule might establish the reference point for people’s 
decisions. Consider in this regard the behavioral finding of loss aversion. People dislike 
losses far  more  than  they  like  corresponding  gains,
25 and  whether  a  loss  or  a  gain  is 
involved does not come from nature or from the sky. The default rule determines what 
counts as a loss and what counts as a gain.  
 
To  appreciate  the  power  of  loss  aversion  and  its  relationship  to  default  rules, 
consider an ingenious study of teacher incentives.
26  Many people have been interested in 
encouraging teachers to do better to improve their students’ achievements. The results of 
providing economic incentives are decidedly mixed; unfortunately, many of these efforts 
have failed. 
27 But the relevant study enlists loss aversion by resetting the default. The 
authors gave teachers money in advance and told them that if students did not show real 
improvements,  the  teachers  would  have  to  give  the  money  back.  The  result  was  a 
significant  increase  in  math  scores  – i ndeed,  an  increase  equivalent  to  a  substantial 
improvement in teacher quality. The underlying idea here is that losses from the status 
quo are especially unwelcome, and people will work hard to avoid those losses. 
 
 In short, what counts as a loss depends on the reference point, which is established 
by  the  default  rule.
28 Suppose,  for  example,  that  employees  are  receiving  $5000  per 
month in take-home salary, and that the question is whether they want some of that 
amount to be deducted for savings. If so, employees might decline. But if employees are 
receiving $4800 per month in take-home salary and $200 per month is going into savings, 
they might not complain -- and they might strongly resist the idea of taking away that 
$200 per month from savings. With respect to the power of default rules, several of the 
findings described thus far are plausibly attributable to loss aversion. 
 
In many areas, loss aversion matters and helps to explain the effect of the default 
rule.  Energy  use  and  environmental  protection  are  among  them.  If,  for  example,  the 
default rule favors energy-efficient light bulbs, and people are asked whether they want 
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less efficient bulbs, then the loss (in terms of reduced efficiency) may loom large and 
they will continue to purchase energy-efficient light bulbs.
 29 But if the default rule favors 
less efficient (and initially less expensive) light bulbs, and people are asked whether they 
want to pay more for efficient ones, then the loss in terms of upfront costs may loom 
large, and there will be a tendency to favor less efficient light bulbs. 
 
The  explanation  for  the  stickiness  of  the  default  rule  may  be  relevant  to  the 
decision about whether to change it. Suppose that people do not alter the default rule 
because  they  believe  that  choice  architects  have  implicitly  endorsed  it.  If  so,  choice 
architects should consider themselves relatively free to adopt the default rule that they do 
in fact endorse. The issue might seem more difficult if the default rule sticks as a result of 
inertia or loss aversion, where there might seem to be a risk that choice architects are 
manipulating people or exploiting behavioral findings.
30 Even in such cases, however, the 
default rule is inevitably having an influence, and hence the question would seem to be 
which default rule is best. That question must be addressed on the merits. 
 
III. Nonsticky (Impersonal) Default Rules 
 
In some circumstances, impersonal default rules do not stick. To understand the uses 
and  limits  of  this  particular  kind  of  nudge,  and  to  see  why  active  choosing  and 
personalized defaults might be better, we need to specify those circumstances. 
 
A.  Clear Preferences and Extreme Defaults 
 
Consider the question of marital names.
31 When people marry, all states in the United 
States have the same default rule: Both men and women retain their pre-marriage names. 
But there is nothing inevitable about the current default rule. We could easily imagine a 
large number of alternatives, for example: 
 
  The husband’s name stays the same, and the wife’s name changes to that of her 
husband. Indeed, that approach, however discriminatory, would mimic people’s 
actual choices, at least in the United States.  
  The husband’s name changes to that of his wife, and the wife’s name stays the 
same.  
  The spouses’ names are hyphenated.  
  The spouses’ names are changed to Skywalker, or Longstocking, or Obama, or 
Gaga, or Potatohead. 
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What are the effects of the current rule? In the overwhelming majority of cases, 
American men do stick with the default. Very few men change their names. By contrast, 
the overwhelming majority of American women do so – 80 percent.
32 In that respect, the 
default rule seems to have little impact on women. 
 
Why doesn’t the default rule stick for women? Three factors seem to be important. 
First, many women (undoubtedly affected by social norms) affirmatively want to change 
their names, and their desire is not unclear.
33 This is not a complex or unfamiliar area in 
which people are unclear about their preferences. Second, the issue is salient to them, and 
because marriage is a defining event, the timing of the required action is relatively clear 
as a social matter at least. Procrastination and inertia are therefore less important. Third, 
the change of name is, for some or many of those who do it, a kind of celebration. It is 
not the sort of activity that people seek to defer. When the relevant conditions are met – 
clear preferences, clear timing, and positive feelings about “opt in” – the default rule is 
unlikely to matter much.
34 
 
Indeed, clear preferences are likely to be sufficient to ensure that the default rule will 
not stick. If preferences are clear, inertia will be overcome; people will not be much 
moved by the endorsement in the default rule
35; and loss aversion will be far less relevant, 
in part because the clear preference helps define the reference point from which losses are 
measured. Suppose that employees are automatically enrolled into a plan that puts 80 
percent of their income into savings, or 60 percent of their income into their nation’s 
treasury (after taxes!), or 20 percent of their income into their worst enemy’s savings 
account,
36 or 10 percent of their income into the toilet. Most of them will undoubtedly opt 
out. A study in the United Kingdom found that most people opted out of a savings plan, 
admittedly less horrible than those just described, but with an unusually high default 
contribution rate (12 percent of before-tax income).
37 Only about 25 percent of employees 
remained at that rate after a year, whereas about sixty percent of employees shifted to a 
lower default contribution rate. Notably, people with lower incomes were more likely to 
stay at the unusually high contribution rate.
38 
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A  clear  implication  is  that  “extreme”  defaults  are  less  likely  to  stick.  A  more 
puzzling implication, based on the lower incomes of those who stayed with the default in 
the study just described, is that default rules may be more sticky for low-income workers 
than for their higher-earning counterparts. One reason may be that low-income workers 
have a great deal to worry about,
39 and so are less likely to take the trouble to think 
through and to alter the default rule. Another may be that low-income workers have less 
confidence in their own judgments, and so they allow the default allocation to stick. 
 
There are other situations in which the default rule does not have a large impact. 
Workers are not so much affected if a significant fraction of their tax refund is defaulted 
into US savings bonds. In significant numbers, they opt out, apparently because they have 
definite plans to spend their refunds and do not have much interest in putting their tax 
refund into savings.
40 The central finding -- that default rules will have a weaker effect, 
and potentially no effect, when people have a strong preference for a certain outcome -- is 
both  a  warning  and  an  opportunity.  It  suggests  that  the  ability  to  opt  out  can  be  an 
important safeguard against defaults that are unhelpful or affirmatively harmful. 
 
B.  Strategic Behavior, Self-Interest, and Facilitating Opt-Out 
 
In  some  situations,  defaults  may  not  stick  even  though  they  are  important 
safeguards. Suppose that self-interested people have a strong incentive to promote opt-
out. If so, they might be able to take steps to achieve their goals. If green energy is far 
less profitable than more conventional energy sources, we can be confident than those 
who sell the latter will take aggressive steps to encourage people to opt out of a default 
rule in favor of green energy. If those steps are not only aggressive but also behaviorally 
informed,  they  might  well  succeed;  they  might,  for  example,  enlist  loss  aversion  to 
encourage opt-out. Here, then, is a serious obstacle to public-interested efforts to use 
defaults to produce desirable social change. 
 
The  problem  is  not  hypothetical.  Consider  the  regulatory  effort  in  2010,  by  the 
Federal  Reserve  Board,  to  protect  people  from  bank  overdraft  fees.
41   The  regulation 
forbids  banks  from  charging  a  fee  for  overdrafts  from  checking  accounts  unless  the 
accountholder has explicitly opted out and enrolled in the bank’s overdraft program.
42  
One of the goals of the default rule is to protect customers, and especially low-income 
customers, from ending up taking the equivalent of extraordinarily high interest loans – 
indeed,  loans  with  interest  rates  of  up  to  7000  percent.
43 In  principle,  the  regulation 
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should have had a large effect, and an understanding of the power of default rules helped 
to motivate it. But the available evidence suggests that the effect may well be modest, 
because people are opting out of the default in large numbers.  
 
What explains this modest effect? As Laurie Willis has shown in an important and 
illuminating article,
44 a central reason is that banks much dislike the regulation, want to 
be able to charge overdraft fees, and have used a number of tools to facilitate opt-out. 
They have taken steps to make opt-out as easy as possible – for example, simply by 
pushing a button on an ATM. They have also engaged in active marketing and created 
economic incentives to persuade people to opt-out. Showing an implicit (or perhaps even 
explicit) understanding of behavioral economics, they exploit loss aversion and consumer 
confusion to encourage accountholders to think that they will lose money if they do not 
opt out. Consider the following excerpt from one bank’s marketing materials, explicitly 
enlisting loss aversion
45: 
 
YES: KEEP MY ACCOUNT WORKING THE SAME WITH SHAREPLUS ATM 
AND DEBIT CARD OVERDRAFT COVERAGE 
NO: CHANGE MY ACCOUNT TO REMOVE SHAREPLUS ATM AND DEBIT 
CARD OVERDRAFT COVERAGE 
 
As Willis quotes a bank employee, “People are scared of change so they’ll opt-in [to 
overdraft] to avoid change.”
46 There is a large contrast here with the retirement context, 
where providers enthusiastically endorse automatic enrollment.
47 The general lesson is 
that if regulated institutions are strongly opposed to the default rule, and have easy access 
to  their  customers,  they  may  well  be  able  to  use  a  variety  of  strategies,  including 
behavioral  ones,  to  encourage  people  to  move  in  their  preferred  directions.  In  some 
circumstances, it may be necessary to take further steps to make the default rule sticky, if 
ensuring that it sticks is indeed the goal. 
II.  Which Default Rule? 
 
In many domains, choice architects can achieve desirable goals, and do so while 
maintaining freedom of choice and at low cost, by selecting good default rules and by 
avoiding harmful ones. But which default rule should choice architects select
48? How do 
we know which is good and which is harmful?  
 
A. Informed Choices 
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These are large questions, and if they are to be answered by reference to the most 
basic  social  commitments,  we  could  imagine  a  number  of  possible  answers.
49 Some 
people might think that the best approach promotes economic efficiency. Others might 
believe that we should choose default rules that are most fair or just. Still others might 
believe that choice architects should decide which rules would maximize social welfare 
and choose accordingly.
50  
 
Begin with the standard case in which there are no (or modest) third-party effects. I 
propose that we might bracket the deepest questions and obtain an incompletely theorized 
agreement on a preferred approach -- that is, an agreement that can attract support from 
people with diverse foundational commitments, and from those who are not sure about 
which commitments they believe to be foundational.
51 The preferred approach is to select 
the default rule that reflects what most people would choose if they were adequately 
informed.
52 The advantage of this approach is that it should appeal, at least in general, to 
those  who  focus  on  efficiency,  welfare,  autonomy,  or  fairness.
53 If  we  know  that  a 
particular default rule would place people in the situation that informed people would 
bargain their way to or select, we have good reason to select that default rule (with the 
understanding that those who differ from the majority may opt out). Suppose that we 
know that 80 percent of people, given a great deal of information, would choose green 
energy. That is a strong reason to favor automatic enrollment in green energy.  
 
To be sure, it might well be necessary to do a great deal of work in order to identify 
the approach that informed people would choose. (As we shall see,  this is a point in 
favor of active choosing.) And in a contractual setting, a default rule that seems to favor 
one side may not, of course, be the provision to which informed people would bargain. 
For  example,  informed  workers  and  informed  employers  may  not  bargain  their  way 
toward a “good cause” provision for the termination of employment if the consequence of 
that  provision  would  be  to  impose  high  costs  on  employers  (and  eventually  on 
employees) without providing important or meaningful safeguards for workers. Informed 
customers and energy companies may refuse to bargain their way to a particular “green” 
default if it turns out to impose much higher costs. (Of course the existence of third party 
effects, taken up below, may argue in favor of green defaults.) 
 
On  this  count,  actual  evidence  about  informed  choice  is  extremely  important.  It 
would  be  useful  to  assemble  information  about  the  level  of  opt-out  under  various 
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alternatives.
54 If only two percent of people opt out under A, and fifty percent opt out 
under B, we have reason to believe that A is better. 
 
Of course it is possible that majority rule is too crude. Suppose that there are two 
default rules, A and B. Suppose that 55 percent of informed people would be relatively 
indifferent between A and B, but would slightly prefer A. Suppose too that because of 
their  unusual  situation,  45  percent  of  people  would  strongly  prefer  B.  We  should 
probably select B, because almost half of the population would much like it, and the 
(narrow) majority only cares a little bit. The example shows that it is important to ask not 
only about which approach would be preferred by informed people, but also about the 
intensity of their preferences.  
 
The most natural way to think of the choice is in terms of costs and benefits. If a 
default rule turned out to stick, what would be the costs and what would be the benefits
55? 
In  the  example  just  given,  default  rule  B  would  almost  certainly  be  best.  We  could 
imagine cases in which the choice between default rules is hard, and in such cases, active 
choosing might be better; I will return to this point. 
 
Note,  however,  that  the  question  of  marital  names  suggests  an  interesting 
qualification to the idea that the default rule should track the choices of informed people. 
Taken seriously, that idea would suggest that states should presume that men want to 
keep their premarital names and that women want to change their names to those of their 
husbands. But a default rule of this kind would be discriminatory, and it would almost 
certainly be found unconstitutional.
56 The example shows that in some settings, informed 
choices  lack  authority  if  they  run  afoul  of  important  social  commitments,  at  least  if 
government proposes to use those choices as a basis for policy.
57 
 
B. Penalty Defaults 
 
If choice architects do not know which rule would be chosen by informed people, 
standard contract theory suggests that they might favor a “penalty default,” designed to 
elicit that information.
58 For example, employees sometimes lack information about their 
legal rights, showing excessive optimism,
59 and a default rule that gives certain rights to 
employees might increase the flow of information between the parties and to the legal 
system.
60 Suppose that if the default rule confers certain rights on employees – say, to job 
security -- employers will want to “buy” those rights. If this is the case, we will see a 
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system in which certain information is disclosed to employees, simply as part of the 
process by which employers bargain. A default rule that protects workers might give 
them important information when they would otherwise overestimate their legal rights.
61 
 
C. Third-Party Effects 
 
If  there  are  third-party  effects,  of  course  the  assessment  of  default  rules  will  be 
affected. Suppose that under default rule A, significant costs are imposed on third parties, 
but that under default rule B, those costs are avoided. If so, B is clearly preferable. In the 
case of default rules for organ donations and energy, this possibility is not hypothetical. A 
default rule in favor of organ donation would of course produce significant benefits to 
third parties.
62 In addition, we could easily imagine energy choices that would impose 
lower environmental and other costs; green defaults might be justifiable on that ground.  
 
In such cases, there is a strong argument for preferring the default rule that reduces 
those costs. Indeed, we might not be in the domain of mere default rules. If B prevents 
the imposition of serious costs on third parties, then there is a strong argument that it 
should be a mandate, not subject to opt-out. But we could imagine cases in which the 
existence  and  magnitude  of  third-party  effects  is  disputed,  and  in  such  (admittedly 
unusual) cases, the best approach might be a default rule that prevents such effects. 
 
IV. Risks: Self-Interest, Mischief, and More 
 
Default  rules  can  of  course  be  badly  chosen  or  misused  by  private  and  public 
institutions  alike.  In  fact  some  such  rules  can  be  extremely  harmful.  Imagine,  for 
example, a voting system that says that if you do nothing, your vote will be registered as 
favoring the incumbent – but that you can opt out if you like. Or imagine a nation that 
defaults you into a certain political party or religion – but that allows you to opt out. Or a 
rental car company that defaults you into all sorts of insurance policies and payment 
plans that are essentially a waste of money – but that allows you to opt out. 
 
Fortunately,  market  forces  constrain  some  of  the  most  harmful  default  rules. 
Competitive markets impose real limits on bad defaults. Before long, customers are not 
likely to go to companies that choose a series of such defaults. For this reason, many 
default  rules  are  helpful  rather  than  harmful;  for  example,  the  default  settings  for 
computers and cell phones are generally in the interest of customers. In some cases, 
however, companies may have an incentive to promote unhelpful defaults, especially 
when they are dealing with fine print, and when the relevant attributes of the product are 
shrouded and not salient.
63 
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Consider in this regard the practice of “negative option marketing.” This practice 
occurs when people who accept a “free” product are automatically enrolled in a plan or 
program that carries a monthly fee (unless they explicitly opt out).
64 Customers might, for 
example, receive a hotel room for free -- but as a result, they might be enrolled in a 
program  that  charges  them  $15  per  month.  The  monthly  charge  might  be  mentioned 
quietly and obscurely if at all, and if it is mentioned, people might be given (quietly) the 
option  to  opt  out.
65 In  some  cases,  negative  option  marketing  has  a  most  unfortunate 
effect, which is that it uses a default rule to exploit the tendency toward inertia in a way 
that can cost people a great deal of money. Customers might not see the monthly bill, or 
if they see it, they might assume that all is well, and they might not cancel the plan until 
they  have  (automatically)  paid  a  great  deal.  In  the  United  States,  the  Federal  Trade 
Commission has expressed serious concerns about this kind of marketing.
66 
 
It is easy to imagine both private and public analogues. Consider, for example, an 
automatic enrollment policy that puts an unreasonably large percentage of employees’ 
salary into savings, or that enrolls them in a health insurance plan that is a bad deal for 
their circumstances, or that signs them up for an exercise plan that they do not need and 
perhaps hate. Automatic enrollment can be a waste or even a disaster. Lest this point be 
misunderstood, recall that the risk, important though it is, does not argue against default 
rules in general. We cannot do without them. The question is which ones are best, not 
whether to have one. (Active choosing is a qualification, to be discussed very shortly.) 
 
To evaluate the use of automatic enrollment, the particular circumstances certainly 
matter.  If  automatic  enrollment  is  not  made  clear  and  transparent  to  those  who  are 
enrolled, it can be considered a form of manipulation. The problem is worse if it is not in 
people’s long-term interest. 
V. Active Choosing 
 
A distinctive approach, sometimes worth serious consideration, is this: Avoid any 
default rule and require active choices.
67 Those who greatly distrust private or public 
institutions,  and  who  want  to  avoid  any  kind  of  steering  by  them,  will  have 
considerable interest in active choices. They will want to deny default rules of any kind 
and put the key questions to people themselves. As we shall see, this approach has 
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special advantages in the face of heterogeneity – especially if default rules would be 
impersonal. 
 
A.  Life Without Defaults 
 
1.  The basic idea.  With  active  choices,  people  are  required  to  make  an  actual 
decision a m o n g  t h e  v a r i o u s  o p t i o n s ;  t h e y  a r e  n o t  d e f a u l t e d  i n t o  a n y  p a r t i c u l a r  
alternative.  With  respect  to  health  care,  privacy,  organ  donation,  and  savings,  for 
example,  choice  architects m i g h t  r e j e c t  b o t h  o p t -out  and  opt-in  and  simply  require 
people to indicate their preferences.  
 
It  is  reasonable  to  speculate  that  active  choosing  would  produce  higher 
participation rates than opt-in but lower than opt-out, and indeed the speculation is 
supported by what we currently know. For example, active choosing has been found to 
result in far higher levels of savings than default rules that require people to opt in (but 
lower  than  automatic  enrollment).
68 Return  to  the  question  of  privacy.  Most w e b  
browsers currently default people into a situation in which their movements are visible 
and can be tracked. Another possibility would be to ask customers -- the first time they 
open the browser or periodically -- about the privacy setting that that they prefer, and 
perhaps to prevent them from proceeding until they answer. A reasonable guess is that 
this approach would produce more privacy than they currently enjoy.
69 
 
2.  Active, but influenced, choosing.  It  is  also  possible  to  imagine  a  variety  of 
variations on active choosing. For example, active choosing might be “enhanced,” or 
influenced, in the sense that one of the choices might be highlighted or favored, perhaps 
through the use of behaviorally informed strategies.
70 If choice architects seek to avoid 
a default rule but nonetheless to promote selection of one of the options, they might list 
it first, or use bold or a large font, or adopt verbal descriptions that make it especially 
salient or appealing.  
 
In one study, choice was “enhanced,” in the sense of being influenced, by enlisting 
loss aversion to discourage selection of the option disfavored by the experimenters.
71 
The experimenters introduced several different messages in the following way: 
 
We would like you to imagine that you are interested in protecting your health. The 
Center for Disease Control indicates that a flu shot significantly reduces the risk of 
getting or passing on the flu virus. Your employer tells you about a hypothetical 
program that recommends you get a flu shot this Fall and possibly save $50 off 
your bi-weekly or monthly health insurance contribution cost. 
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In the opt-in condition, people were asked to “Place a check in the box if you will 
get a Flu shot this Fall.” In a neutral active choice condition, people were asked to 
“Place a check in one box: I will get a flu shot this Fall or, I will not get a flu shot this 
Fall.” With enhanced or influenced choice, people were asked to choose between two 
alternatives: “I will get a Flu Shot this Fall to reduce my risk of getting the flu and I 
want to save $50 or, I will not get a Flu Shot this Fall even if it means I may increase 
my risk of getting the flu and I don't want to save $50.” Compared to opt-in, the active 
choice condition led to a significant increase in the percentage of people who would get 
a flu shot -- and the percentage was highest when active choice was influenced.
72  
 
There is an obvious parallel here with the efforts of banks to promote opt out by 
enlisting loss aversion and other behaviorally informed strategies. The principal point is 
that active choosing can be more or less neutral with respect to the relevant options. As 
the choice architect becomes decreasingly neutral, active choosing starts to look closer 
to a default rule. 
 
B.  In Favor of Active Choosing 
 
Let us put the question of influence to one side and assume that if choice architects 
favor active choosing, they will remain neutral and not attempt to affect the choice. What 
might be said on behalf of this approach? 
 
 The initial point is that because a decision is required, active choosing overcomes 
inertia. If inertia (and procrastination) are playing a significant role, active choosing may 
be far better than opt-in. Consider savings plans, health insurance, and privacy settings. 
The  problem  with  opt-in  is  that  it  will  likely  ensure  that  some  people  end  up  with 
outcomes that they would not prefer if they were to make a choice. A key virtue of active 
choosing is that it increases the likelihood that people will end up with their desired 
outcomes.  
 
In  addition,  active  choosing  is  a  safeguard  against  uninformed  or  self-interested 
choice architects. When choice architects lack relevant information, so that the chosen 
rule  might  be  harmful  to  some  or  many,  there  are  significant  advantages  to  active 
choosing. Suppose that a private institution is producing the default rule, and it really 
does not know a great deal about what informed people would choose. In the context of 
ice cream flavors, tablets, cell phones, and sneakers, active choosing is far better than an 
impersonal default rule. The same is true for many activities and goods provided by 
private  institutions.  Or  suppose  that  the  government  is  producing  the  default  rule.  If 
public officials are biased or inadequately informed, and if the default rule is no better 
than a guess, that rule might lead people in the wrong direction. The same point argues 
against a default rule, and in favor of active choosing, when self-interested private groups 
are calling for it even though it would not benefit those on whom it is imposed. Active 
choosing is much less risky on these counts. If we do not trust public officials – perhaps 
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because they do not know everything, perhaps because their motivations may not be pure 
– we might like active choosing best.
73  
 
Finally,  and  in  some  cases  most  important,  active  choosing  appropriately  handles 
diversity. As compared with either opt-in or opt-out, active choosing can have major 
advantages  when  the  relevant  group  is  heterogeneous,  so  that  a  single  approach  is 
unlikely to fit diverse circumstances. If one size does not fit all for health insurance or 
savings, then choice architects might want to ensure that people make choices on their 
own.  For  this  reason,  active  choosing  may  be  far  better.  In  the  face  of  diversity,  an 
impersonal default rule may be especially harmful, because the power of inertia, or the 
force of suggestion, may mean that many people will end up in a situation that is not in 
their interest. People might be far better off if they are asked, “what health insurance plan 
do  you  like  best?”  than  if  they  are  automatically  enrolled  in  a  plan  chosen  by  their 
employer. 
  
C. Against Active Choosing 
 
Notwithstanding  its  potential  benefits,  active  choosing  could  also  create  serious 
problems. To see why, consider the words of Esther Duflo, one of the world’s leading 
experts on poverty: 
 
We tend to be patronizing about the poor in a very specific sense, which is that we 
tend to think, ‘Why don’t they take more responsibility for their lives?’ And what we 
are forgetting is that the richer you are the less responsibility you need to take for 
your own life because everything is taken care for you. And the poorer you are the 
more  you  have  to  be  responsible  for  everything  about  your  life….Stop  berating 
people for not being responsible and start to think of ways instead of providing the 
poor with the luxury that we all have, which is that a lot of decisions are taken for us. 
If we do nothing, we are on the right track. For most of the poor, if they do nothing, 
they are on the wrong track.
 74 
 
Duflo’s central claim is that people who are well off do not have to be responsible 
for a wide range of things, because others are making the relevant decisions, and to their 
benefit. In countless domains, choices are in fact “taken for us,” and in a sense, such steps 
even  promote  our  autonomy,  because  we  are  freed  up  to  spend  our  time  on  other 
matters.
75 
 
The  point  suggests  an  initial  problem  with a ctive  choosing,  which  is  that  it c an 
impose large burdens on choosers. That burden may in fact be quite unwelcome. Suppose 
that the situation is unfamiliar and complicated. Suppose that people lack information or 
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experience. If so, active choosing may impose unjustified or excessive costs on people; it 
might  produce  frustration  and  appear  to  require  pointless  red-tape.  Most  consumers 
would not much like it if, at the time of purchase, they had to choose every feature of 
their cell phone plan or all of their computer’s initial settings. The existence of defaults 
saves people a lot of time, and most of them may well be sensible and suitable. Few 
consumers would like to spend the time required to obtain relevant information and to 
decide what choice to make. As compared with a default rule, active choosing increases 
the costs of decisions, possibly significantly. 
 
At the same time, active choosing can impose large burdens on providers. Defaults 
can be desirable and even important for those who provide goods or services. The reason 
is  that  they  avoid  costs,  which  might  result  in  increases  in  prices  (and  thus  harm 
consumers as well). Without a series of default rules, significant resources might have to 
be devoted to patient, tedious explanations and to going through the various options with 
consumers or users, who might not welcome the exercise. 
 
A final point is that active choosing can increase errors. The goal of active choosing 
is to make people better off. But if the area is unfamiliar, highly technical, and confusing, 
active choosing might have the opposite effect. If consumers are required to answer a set 
of technical questions, and if the choice architects know what they are doing, then people 
will probably enjoy better outcomes with defaults. 
VI. Personalized Default Rules 
My focus thus far has been on default rules that are impersonal, in the sense that they 
apply to all members of the relevant population, subject to the ability to opt out. But as I 
have  noted,  some  default  rules  are  highly  personalized.  Such  approaches  draw  on 
available information about which approach best suits different groups of people, and 
potentially each individual person, in the relevant population. It is possible to imagine a 
continuum  of  personalized  approaches,  from  most  fine-grained  to  the  most  crude.  In 
principle, choice architects could design default rules for every one of us. Perhaps this 
idea  seems  a  bit  like  science  fiction,  but  in  the  fullness  of  time,  private  and  public 
institutions are likely to use a large number of personalized default rules. In fact we are 
already heading in that direction. 
 
At least in general and in principle, the design of such personalized rules would be a 
great boon. The key advantage of such rules is that they are likely to be more accurate 
and thus beneficial than “mass” default rules. As technology evolves and information 
accumulates, it should be increasingly possible to produce highly personalized defaults, 
based on people’s own choices and situations. For this reason, there will be promising 
opportunities to use default rules to promote people’s welfare.  
 
Every day, family members and friends use the equivalent of personalized default 
rules.  They  tend  to  know  what  people  like  in  various  domains,  and  with  respect  to 
conversation, food, restaurants, vacations, and more, they use those personalized defaults 
to people’s benefit. They do not ask, in every case, for an active choice, which would 
make life more complicated and potentially even intolerable. Sometimes spouses order   21 
for one another at restaurants, or select clothing for them, using the functional equivalent 
of default rules and pursuant to an implicit delegation.
76 Indeed, a large part of what it 
means to be a spouse, a partner, or a close friend is to be able to identify such defaults. 
(By contrast, strangers rely on impersonal ones, which may cause trouble.) 
 
A. Tracking and Extrapolating 
 
A personalized default might be based on people’s own past choices or on those of 
people  “like  them.”  Consider,  for  example,  Amazon.com,  which  provides 
recommendations to its customers on the basis of their past choices. Amazon.com knows 
that if customers like mysteries by a certain author, they will probably like mysteries by 
another author as well. Amazon.com might be thought to create something in the general 
vicinity of default rules, in the form of visible, salient choices. Of course the presentation 
of such choices is akin to advice and not literally a default, in the sense that if customers 
do nothing, they will purchase nothing. But the same technologies could easily be used to 
create defaults of multiple kinds.  
 
Once  enough  information  is  available  about  Joe  Smith,  choice  architects  could 
design, for Joe Smith, default rules with respect health insurance, privacy, rental card 
agreements,  computer  settings,  and  much e l s e .   For  some  services,  including  travel, 
personalized defaults are have become familiar and common. If a website knows where 
customers like to sit on an airplane, and how they like to pay, it can use this information 
to generate outcomes (subject to customer revision). Personalized default rules can also 
be dynamic, in the sense that they can change over time. The best default rules or settings 
for a particular person, in one year, might be very different from those in the next year. In 
principle, the default rules could change on a daily or even hourly basis. As private and 
public  institutions  receive  increasing  amounts  of  information  about  each  of  us,  this 
project is becoming increasingly feasible. Multiple websites are already moving in this 
direction, providing defaults for people based on their own past choices. In general, those 
defaults make life simpler and more convenient. 
 
We could imagine a large variety of possibilities here. In some cases, defaults might 
be based directly on people’s own past choices. In other cases, defaults might involve a 
degree of extrapolation from those choices. Choice architects might think that if people 
have made certain choices with respect to privacy in the domain of health insurance, they 
are  likely  to  make  certain  choices  with  respect  to  privacy  in  other  domains  as  well. 
Consider the familiar idea, with respect to consumer products, that if certain consumers 
actually like certain products, they are likely to like certain other products as well. If 
sufficient data are available, personalized default rules might be generated in this way. 
 
B. Information Acquisition and Privacy 
 
                                                 
76
 A cautionary note here, at once amusing and sad, and suggesting that people often make significant 
mistakes about what their family members and friends like, is JOEL WALDFOGEL, SCROOGENOMICS (2008). 
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One challenge is that for defaults to be personalized, choice architects must obtain a 
great deal of information. In some contexts, obtaining such information is essentially 
costless. On websites, people make repeated choices, and if choice architects know what 
they usually choose, they can make that usual choice the default. Return to the case of 
travel preferences, or consider shipping times and credit cards for book purchases. But in 
other cases, there will be no such track record, at least at the beginning, and acquisition of 
relevant information will be costly or perhaps impossible. Suppose, for example, that 
people are purchasing new computers, and the question is the appropriate privacy setting 
for them. Personalized default rules are unlikely to be feasible. 
 
Even if they are feasible, there is an additional challenge, which is that if defaults are 
based on people’s past choices, there is a potential concern about privacy. By hypothesis, 
choice architects can identify those choices, and some choosers will not be delighted by 
that fact. People might well object if others know that they tend to like (say) silly science 
fiction novels -- and that for that reason, they are being defaulted into a wide range of 
choices favored by people who like such novels. We might make a distinction here. 
Perhaps choice architects themselves – those who run relevant programs or websites – 
know about people’s past choices; in fact such knowledge would seem inevitable (though 
there may be retention issues). Alternatively, choice architects might reveal those choices 
to other people. It is easily imaginable that choosers would object to the latter even if 
they would not object to the former. If they object to the latter, sharing of that kind 
should probably not be permitted – and a prohibition on sharing will make it harder to 
generate personalized defaults. 
 
There is a potential solution to the privacy problem, which is that choice architects  
might  use active choosing or personalized default rules with respect to privacy itself. 
Perhaps choice architects know that Jones is fiercely protective of her privacy and that in 
the face of any kind of doubt, she prefers to prevent other people from knowing about her 
behavior and her choices. If so, that very knowledge can be used to produce privacy-
protective default rules. In the case of doubt, active choosing might be selected, so that 
people do not give up privacy unless they explicitly state their willingness to do so. With 
respect  to  privacy,  there  is  a  great  deal  of  heterogeneity,  which  argues  for  active 
choosing. 
 
C. Demographics 
 
Less ambitiously, personalized default rules might be based on group characteristics, 
such as geographical or demographic variables. For example, age and income might be 
used in determining appropriate default rules for retirement plans. In fact this approach is 
already standard. For example, universities typically default faculty members into what 
seems  to  be  an  appropriate  plan  (subject  of  course  to  easy  out).  With  respect  to 
employees over sixty, the default allocation might be different from what it would be 
with respect to employees who are thirty, and for those with large incomes, the default 
might be different from what it would be for those who are making a little. The general 
idea is that your default rules would track what would be best for “people like you.”  
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Evidence  suggests  that  for  retirement  plans,  default  rules  that  respect  diversity 
(especially  with  respect  to  age)  are  indeed  feasible  –  and  that  they  can  increase  the 
probability of enrollment in the default plan by 60 percent. They can also create very 
large  gains  for  participants.
77 We  could  easily  imagine  similar  approaches  to  health 
insurance, credit cards, cell phones, mortgages, and much more. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Whether  or  not  we  notice  them,  default  rules  are  omnipresent.  They  establish 
settings  for  many  activities  and  goods,  including  cell  phones,  rental  car  agreements, 
computers, savings plans, health insurance, and energy use.
78 In countless domains, they 
identify the consequences if choosers do nothing. In part because of the power of inertia, 
default rules tend to stick.  
 
When the relevant group is not diverse, and when an impersonal default rule will 
satisfy  the  informed  preferences  of  the  members  of  that  group, i t  is  probably  most 
sensible to select that default rule rather than to require active choosing. If the underlying 
issue is complex and unfamiliar, active choosing might be a burden rather than a benefit. 
But when the group is relevantly diverse, when choosing is actually preferred, and when 
private or public institutions cannot be trusted or lack good information about which 
default rule is best, active choosing has significant advantages. The question involves the 
costs of decisions and the costs of errors. Personalized default rules might reduce the 
problems associated with one-size-fits-all defaults, and thus provide most of the benefits 
of  active  choosing,  at  least  if  the  relevant  choice  architects  are  informed  and 
trustworthy.
79 In many domains, personalized default rules are the wave of the future; we 
should  expect  to  see  a  significant  increase  in  personalization  as  greater  information 
becomes available about the informed choices of diverse people. 
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